‘Philanthropy and Climate Change’

A list of very serious problems we face today would still be long and daunting. But I think it’s fair to say that none of the problems is more serious, or more daunting, than climate change. Civilizations rise and fall as a result of changing climate, and history is replete with societies that simply vanished when the local climate changed. But the threat we face now is bigger than that: much bigger. Because it’s not local, it’s global. Manmade activity is changing the climate of the entire world, and the effects will be felt everywhere and by everyone.

We are already experiencing significant effects with costly consequences. Worse, we have already locked in a future increase whose effects will be considerably direr. Dire, but still manageable. The question humanity faces is whether we will deal with this sufficiently to stop there, or whether we’ll continue on a pathway that bequeaths
our great grandchildren a world that resembles nothing so much as “The Road Warrior” (which is, for those of you who don’t know, the second, and best, Mad Max movie).

Yet while the threat is both huge and global, addressing it is absolutely within our reach, and excruciatingly close at hand. It doesn’t require upending economies or systems of government. It doesn’t require impossible behavioral change or anything remotely that drastic. Given structures and technologies available right now, it is still possible to make the transition from climate change-causing fossil fuels to clean energy over a reasonable period of time. But only if we get our act together and get out of our own way.

Philanthropy has a useful, and potentially important, role to play in helping make that happen, which is what I’ll talk about today. I’ll start with a few words about what foundations do and how we work, then offer a quick history of climate philanthropy to date, followed by some ideas about where the fight to save our climate goes from here. This last topic is important because, after enormous progress in the years after Copenhagen, further advances are threatened by the recent American election and by the wave of nationalism sweeping through the developed world.

Let’s start with philanthropy, which is, I’ll admit, a peculiar endeavor—especially the professional philanthropy of endowed foundations. As I like to say, we don’t actually do anything. We give money to others, who do all the work. But, of course, our choices about who to support, how to support them, and for what kind of work, make an enormous difference.

Our biggest asset in this—which many also see as our biggest liability—is that we are unaccountable. Our choices of who to support and why to support them are not constrained by market forces or the need to make a profit. And apart from a requirement to support activities and organizations that are “charitable,” broadly understood, we are also largely free from political control. That means we can get involved in controversial issues. It means we can test and try things without worrying about failure. Most important, it means we can be patient: we can stick with efforts for a long time, if need be. This makes it possible to build new fields, foster ecosystems of
organizations, and develop and pursue complex strategies that involve many moving parts.

The tools we have available to do this are relatively straightforward. We can support organizations that do research and generate evidence. We can support organizations that turn evidence into policy solutions, as well as organizations that advocate to get those solutions adopted. We can support organizations that help implement policy or that provide direct services or do work directly, and we can support organizations that evaluate and assess how things are going. In appropriate circumstances, we can invest in for-profit ventures, if they have a proper charitable purpose (this is “impact investing”), and we can also work directly with government: funding short-term positions or public-private partnerships, filling gaps in research or funding, testing new approaches to service delivery, and the like. We can lobby for executive action in appropriate ways and circumstances, including regulations, though we cannot lobby for legislation. Oh, and we can convene: the convening power of large foundations is in fact quite powerful, especially our ability to bring together parties and organizations that won’t otherwise speak to each other. We’re a neutral meeting ground.

The art of philanthropy, then, entails choosing a goal (say, mitigating the effects of climate change to keep global warming below 2 degrees centigrade) and then developing a strategy to support organizations capable of achieving it. Rarely, if ever, can one achieve a goal simply by supporting a single organization. Rather, we have to coordinate our resources and figure out all the different things that need to happen, and in what order, and then work with organizations whose work, cumulatively, will bring that about. It’s more complicated than you might imagine.

Climate philanthropy is a good example. So let me briefly review the history here. Awareness of climate change grew slowly throughout the 1990s and into the early years of the 21st century. By the late 1990s and early 2000s, climate policy was no longer the purview only of scientists and a few government wonks, and national leaders and people around the world were increasingly open to doing something about it.

Climate philanthropy, in the meantime, was practically non-existent. It had never been a distinct philanthropic field, and most foundations were pretty happy with what
they were already doing. With a handful of exceptions, what support existed was sporadic and around the edges of other environmental work. Hewlett, for example, found its way into climate through land conservation, learning about the issue in the context of work to preserve western ecosystems from fossil fuel development.

Then, in 2006, Hal Harvey—who helped launch the Energy Foundation in 1991 and became Director of Hewlett’s Environment Program in 2002—funded a study by California Environment Associates to determine whether and how a global effort might be launched to keep global warming to two degrees above pre-industrial levels (the de facto target that had emerged over time as reflecting tolerable effects). The study, entitled “Design to Win,” catalyzed what I believe unquestionably constitutes the most ambitious philanthropic effort ever launched.

Rather than walk through the details of how that effort took shape, let me simply sketch the basic framework. “Design to Win” proposed a relatively simple approach to the climate problem. In fact, the combination of simplicity and ambition is really pretty breathtaking. It began by noting that to keep global warming below two degrees we need to reduce annual CO2 emissions (or their equivalent) by 32 gigatons by 2030. If we could get on that path, it would be feasible to reach zero emissions by around 2070.

But how to do it? On the face of things, that’s a staggering effort, involving a 50% reduction in expected emissions. The sheer immensity of it seemed overwhelming. So, they broke the problem down into smaller pieces. First, they divided sources of emissions into seven sectors: power generation, industrial processes, buildings, appliances, vehicles, other transportation systems, and forests (which emit carbon when burned but also cease withdrawing it when denuded). Then they divided the world into geographic sectors, with a focus on the six biggest emitters: the U.S., Europe, China, India, Latin America (Brazil/Mexico), and Indonesia.

The resulting seven-by-six matrix enabled one to look at discrete emissions problems, like power generation in China, automobiles in the U.S., or appliances in India. In each box of the matrix, fondly called “the Sudoku,” they calculated the reduction in emissions that could plausibly be achieved by 2030 with technically feasible policy changes. So power generation reform in China might plausibly reduce
emissions by 3.6 gigatons, and fuel efficiency standards in the U.S. might plausibly reduce emissions from vehicles by .8 gigatons, and so on. All one needed to do was to pick squares from the 42 available whose total added up to 32 gigatons.

But how to do that? Think about the organizational challenge. And here, too, the solution was ingenious. To begin, they proposed to create a central hub—the ClimateWorks Foundation—which would serve as grantor of funds to a coordinated global network. The network, in turn, consisted of two sorts of organizations. First, there were “regional climate foundations” or RFCs. RFCs had expertise in particular geographies and would serve as regrantors of funds from ClimateWorks to the most appropriate NGOs for particular work. There was, for example, the Energy Foundation in the U.S., the European Climate Foundation (or ECF) in Europe, Energy Foundation-China in China, Shakti Sustainable Energy Foundation in India, Latin America Regional Climate Initiative (LARCI) in Latin America, and Climate and Land Use Alliance (CLUA) in Indonesia (though it also works in Central and South America). A second set of organizations were called “best practices networks” or BPNs. These brought expertise in particular sectors, one in each sector for a total of seven. So, there was the International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT), and the Institute for Industrial Productivity, and so on. To work on transportation in Europe, then, ClimateWorks would simply channel money to ECF and ICCT to work together on the problem. In this way, we could support work simultaneously and in coordination on all the most promising squares in the Sudoku.

To fund this work for the first five years, the Hewlett and Packard Foundations committed $500 million and $400 million, respectively, to which the McKnight Foundation added another $100 million. The assumption—hope is probably more accurate—was that once the network was up and running, other funders would add still more funds. The goal was to have $600 million annually by year five.

The ClimateWorks network was launched in 2007. At first, things went relatively well, and a great deal was accomplished, particularly in Europe and the United States. But by 2012, it was clear that something was wrong. Again, rather than walk through the particulars, let me simply describe the problems that had emerged.
First and foremost, ClimateWorks was built to provide technical support to governments that seemed prepared to do something about climate change. That was a plausible assumption in 2007, but by 2009, the world had changed. Two major political failures signified the difference: the failure to reach a global agreement at the 15th COP in Copenhagen, and the failure of the U.S. Congress to pass the Waxman-Markey bill. Climate deniers, who had been somewhat listless in the early 2000s, shifted into high gear to defeat these two efforts, and in the process of succeeding turned climate into a political and partisan issue in a way that was entirely new. As a result, it no longer was enough to offer technical support on how to achieve emission reductions. Making anything happen required an equally concerted and sophisticated effort at policy and public advocacy, something the ClimateWorks network had not been set up to do.

On top of that, it turned out that the emissions problems could not be confined to the squares of the Sudoku. Change in one place had effects in another: ECF’s grantees in Germany were successful in reducing coal consumption there only to see the same coal make its way to Poland. It was like a game of Whack-a-Mole.

Third, new and unexpected developments emerged and changed the entire game board. No one in 2006 anticipated the rapid development of fracking or of cheap natural gas. And the fixed structure of the ClimateWorks network proved slow to adapt to the changes.

Fourth, and most important, not a single other funder proved willing to put money into the ClimateWorks pool. No one wanted to surrender control over their grant dollars. Instead, they went directly to the organizations in the network, the RCFs and the BPNs, and funded projects of their own. That might not have been bad, except the lack of coordination meant a loss of focus in the overall effort.

I arrived at Hewlett in 2012, just as the original commitment to ClimateWorks was coming to an end. ClimateWorks’ grantees had accomplished a lot, making progress across the globe in reducing emissions, albeit less than had been projected and far less than we ultimately needed. But the high profile effort and the organizations it created and supported catalyzed global climate philanthropy more broadly. Many new funders were in the field; the RCFs and BPNs that ClimateWorks had created or
fostered were strong institutions; and regranting from the RCFs had helped launch many more national, regional, and local nonprofit efforts. The pieces needed for global success, which had not existed in 2007, were now in place.

So we stepped back and reconfigured the strategy. We retained the ambition: to fully address climate mitigation and put the world on a path to keep warming below two degrees. But we approached achieving that goal in a new way. We started with the funders, because without coordination in the deployment of resources, success was impossible. But, we had learned, funders weren’t interested in simply pooling their grant dollars, so we tried something different. Rather than ask funders to pool their money and surrender control, we asked them to join together at a “funders’ table.” Each foundation would retain decision making authority about what grants to make, but all would come to the table with an open mind: listening to what others thought and intended to do, willing to share information and reshape their grant decisions in light of what they learned. To conform to the new structure, we changed the role of ClimateWorks from a place for funders to pool resources to a strategy developer and coordinator for the funders’ table. ClimateWorks retained grantmaking authority, but on a smaller scale and with the idea that its grantmaking would be primarily to fill gaps, test new ideas, and move money quickly when speed was essential.

As important as changes in the structure, were changes in the strategy itself. We abandoned the idea of a fixed network for a fluid one. We retained the RCFs, which had proved invaluable as partners, working with them to enhance their capacity to support sophisticated policy advocacy. But we moved to an approach where funding went to whatever organization could best advance our shared goals. And we replaced the Sudoku with global “campaigns” focused broadly on sources: (1) a campaign to promote clean energy (chiefly replacing coal in electricity generation), (2) a campaign to reduce reliance on oil (chiefly focused on transportation), (3) a campaign to address non-CO2 forcers (such as black carbon, methane, HFCs, etc.), (4) a campaign to promote energy efficiency, and (5) a campaign to reduce deforestation. In addition, we added cross-cutting campaigns for communications and finance.

While not without hiccups, the new structure and approach have worked well. The group of foundations coordinating grew steadily, and the original three funders are
now a group of more than a dozen foundations from across the globe. The amount of money being coordinated has grown from the original $200 million per year to more than $500 million, and the quality of the coordination is significantly better.

More important, after the low point of 2010-2012, funders and grantees began to turn things around in achieving mitigation goals. I should preface this with a caveat. Philanthropy played a role in supporting research, expertise, and effective policy advocacy, but chief credit for the turnaround must go to President Obama, who made climate a major focus of his second term and who, almost singlehandedly, reinvigorated the global political process. There was already movement, but his constantly pushing, not to mention bilateral agreements he made with India and China, were pivotal.

In any event, by 2016, the progress made was simply stunning. Yes, policies that have been adopted still need to be implemented. And, yes, they are still shy of what we need to achieve a two degree target, much less the “well below” two degrees that came out of Paris. But for the first time, the expected temperature rise in the 21st century has not only flattened, but begun to bend downwards, with 2.7-3.0 degrees in sight, and a process for ratcheting up ambitions in place. Momentum was powerful and on our side.

2016 itself was an extraordinary year. The most important achievements included:

- **Paris.** Okay, technically, the agreement was made in December 2015. But by November 2016, enough nations had ratified to put the treaty into effect—an incredibly swift process. Follow through on the “Nationally Determined Contributions” (NDCs) pledged by individual nations will reduce warming in this century by 1-1.5 degrees.

- **Kigali.** In October, the nations of the world also agreed to amend the Montreal Protocol to phase out HFCs. This could save an additional quarter to half degree of warming by century’s end. Plus efficiency gains from the process of implementation will make it easier for developing nations to achieve their NDCs, helping with additional warming avoided of as much as a half degree.
• **Aviation.** Aviation emissions were not discussed in Paris, but also in October, and after years of negotiation, 191 nations adopted a global market-based measure to address emissions from aviation—the first global agreement to address emissions by an entire industry.

• After years of growth, global **coal consumption fell** by nearly two percent in 2015—a product of cheaper natural gas in the U.S., economic restructuring in China, and the growth of renewables and clean energy alternatives globally.

• Speaking of clean energy, **new solar and wind are now as or less expensive** than new fossil fuels in more than thirty countries, including the big emitters. Renewables accounted for more than half of new power generation globally in 2016, and new investment reached a record high $330 billion.

• **Growth in global GDP was finally decoupled from fossil fuels,** as global CO2 emissions held flat in 2014 and 2015, even as global GDP grew by three percent.

Then Donald Trump was elected, declaring climate change to be a hoax and putting climate deniers into all the relevant positions. I mean, who would have thought that the new Administration’s best appointment from a climate perspective would be the CEO of Exxon-Mobil?!?

It’s profoundly disheartening. Conservatives and liberals may have lots to argue and disagree about with respect to how to address climate change: whether to focus on adapting to changes already happening or worry about preventing more in the future, what vehicles to use in seeking to reduce emissions, how to choose between regulation and market solutions, and so on. But to say it’s a hoax or isn’t happening—or, worse, to double down on fossil fuels—is just depressing. In any event, given that the U.S. has been the global leader in pushing nations to do something, not to mention the second largest emitter, Trump’s ascension obviously requires some strategic rethinking.

It’s not entirely clear yet just how far Trump will go. His cabinet appointees suggested in their hearings that the U.S. would pull back, but not out. But more recent reports suggest serious consideration is being given to backing out not only from Paris,
but from the UNFCCC too. What is clear, in any event, is that the U.S. will no longer be exercising leadership. The federal government will no longer be doing anything to contribute to a solution, and it is likely to take steps to reinvigorate fossil fuel production in the U.S.

Of course, it could have been worse: The Trump Administration might have decided to throw the weight of U.S. diplomacy into undoing international efforts and the global process. And that would be disastrous, because even a discredited U.S. administration has a lot of weight to throw around. But the plan seems to be withdrawal, combined with indifference to what happens elsewhere.

That will still require a lot of strategic adjustment. So let me offer some preliminary thoughts about the shape of the post-Trump effort to mitigate climate change. First, what will happen to the Paris Agreement? The agreement has already gone into effect. Rex Tillerson said the U.S. should stay engaged, but even if that means not withdrawing, the U.S. is likely to be at most a passive participant. One consequence is that the U.S. could well abandon its obligations under the agreement, including its contributions to the Green Climate Fund and to the multilateral pledge to make $100 billion per year available to developing nations by 2020.

It does not follow that other nations will abandon the agreement or their commitments. In fact, it was in some ways fortunate that Trump was elected just as the agreement went into force and the nations of the world met in Marrakesh for the 22nd COP. Because it led other nations to reaffirm their commitment to carrying out the agreement—an affirmation embodied in the Marrakesh Action Proclamation. This response suggests two things of significance. First, that the other nations of the world feel co-ownership of the Paris Agreement. Second, that they believe it in their own national interest to fulfill their Paris obligations regardless of what the U.S. does.

Both implications follow to some extent from the unique nature of the agreement, which was negotiated from the bottom up. That is, nations were brought into the process with arguments about how participating was in their domestic interest, rather than by making appeals to some sense of international obligation. The NDCs plainly reflect this, with each nation committing to make changes that make sense for it.
And the agreement has always relied on self-interest for enforcement, which is why there are no formal sanctions. So long as nations perceive that fulfilling their NDCs is in their own interest, retreat by any one country, even the U.S., should not greatly affect the others. (By the way, philanthropy has an important role to play in helping nations meet their NDCs. Here is where technical assistance remains useful, indeed critically important—especially in developing nations. In addition, philanthropy can support independent sources of monitoring to ensure the transparency around progress that is necessary to make the agreement work.)

But self-interest won’t take us all the way there. The process calls for nations to ratchet up their ambition in a couple of years, and that won’t happen without some pressure. Plus, the agreement has international aspects (such as the promise of aid to finance clean energy transitions in the developing world). So new leadership will be needed to replace the U.S., and this may be the worst consequence of our withdrawal, because it’s not immediately apparent who can or will step into that gap. The nations of the High Ambition Coalition lack the political weight to do so. China has that, and Xi Jinping has said some things that make this seem possible. But China has shied away from playing this kind of role in the past, and the Chinese have domestic divisions of their own to deal with. The EU would be natural, but it’s struggling with a weak economy and its own wave of nationalism. Keeping the EU from backsliding may be challenge enough; holding it together at all may be an issue.

The truth is that no single country or entity can replace the U.S. in global leadership. We will instead need to advocate for a new kind of shared leadership: advocating for a “coalition of the willing” to press for continued progress on climate. Framed that way, we probably can count on China and the EU to play a constructive role, and a variety of other players might add support: Canada, Brazil, Columbia, and Chile, for example. But getting nations to play this way will take pressure and thoughtful advocacy, both in each country and around multilateral meetings like the G7, G20, and Davos. We must use these settings to send a strong message that the global community wants to stay on track.

Equally important will be rallying support from two other groups whose continued engagement in mitigating climate change will be crucial going forward. I
mean, first, business associations, which increasingly recognize the risks they face and are active in wanting to see action on global warming. Among the important actors here are “We Mean Business,” the World Economic Forum, and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development. As or more important are networks of subnational governments that formed in Paris and are committed to taking action without regard for their country’s national policy. These include the C40, the Global Compact of Mayors, and signers of the “Under 2 degrees MOU.” Lastly, we can and need to begin to rally other national and local institutions (like trade unions, consumer organizations, grass roots community organizers, and the like) to hold their governments accountable to do their part. These networks of new actors provide an opportunity to sustain or even accelerate action on climate change, and we must do our utmost to enlarge and strengthen them.

Making Paris work is important, but not more important than sustaining and accelerating the role of financial institutions, both public and private, in addressing climate change. If we step back, we can view the first phase in the fight to mitigate global warming as solving a huge microeconomic challenge: to foster a transition from fossil fuels to renewables, renewables must first become cost competitive. And most of the work of philanthropy to date has been an attempt to do just that, whether by reducing the cost of producing wind or solar (via supporting research or regulatory incentives or subsidies and other like efforts) or by increasing the cost of unconstrained fossil fuel use (via litigation which can make fossil fuel companies internalize the costs of carbon, as opposed to externalizing them on surrounding communities and vulnerable populations). Much remains to be done, but success is in sight. As I noted above, renewables are now cheaper or no more expensive than new fossil fuels in many of the world’s biggest energy consumers, and rapid gains are being made elsewhere and on other issues (like transportation). The world can’t declare victory yet, but success on the microeconomic front is close at hand.

With that, it has become time to turn to the macroeconomic problem—namely, transforming the world’s energy infrastructure. Technologies exist to supply people with clean energy, but only if national energy infrastructures are modernized to do so. And this requires massive investments, on the order of $90 trillion over the next thirty years. The money is there. Between the Major Development Banks, the National and
Regional Development Banks, and other Development Finance Institutions there are more than enough resources to get this going. And private funds hold even more opportunity, with estimates of upwards of $120 trillion looking for new investment opportunities right now.

Presently, a great many obstacles stand in the way. These include a shortage of developed projects and of finance vehicles, uncertainty around how to price risk, a lack of reliable financial intermediaries, uncertainty about the regulatory environment in developing nations, and so on. Plus, when it comes to development banks and other DFIs, we add inertia, bureaucratic stodginess, and inability to collaborate into the mix.

Fortunately, these are all problems that philanthropy can help address, and doing so must be a high priority going forward. We can provide technical expertise in developing feasible projects, as well as in crafting both finance vehicles and regulatory frameworks that build investor confidence. We can help develop and launch intermediary organizations to connect deals with investors, and we can make funds available to help projects reach a stage of development where they become eligible for international aid. We can help structure investment pyramids to reduce risk and catalyze private investment for appropriate projects. And we can work with development banks and DFIs, as well as with finance ministers, to make it easier to obtain funds for clean energy investing.

Another potentially fruitful and related arena for philanthropic investment is in helping businesses properly price and disclose climate-related risk. The recent recommendations of the Financial Stability Board, now out for public comment, provide a useful starting point, making a powerful case for the need for every business to include climate risk in its portfolio. The near-term risk to companies whose business model is based on extracting, producing, or consuming fossil fuels is obvious. But the risk is broader, and the ongoing transition to a low-carbon economy has near-term consequences in virtually every economic sector and industry. Both as a matter of legally required disclosure of material risk and sensible governance, it is time for businesses to begin routinely reflecting and reporting on climate risks, as well as developing strategies to manage them.
Bear in mind, this is not a situation where businesses have, in fact, taken these risks into account and simply not been reporting. Rather, especially outside the energy industry, climate risk has been treated as a long-term problem, unlikely to affect operations or profits in the near term and so ignored. People in these companies know better, but they have been unwilling to face the reality of carbon risk, which is why the FSB issued its recommendations. If companies address this risk, the effect will be equivalent to internalizing the costs of carbon, exposing a liability they must then take steps to reduce or eliminate, which will encourage faster movement away from emitting CO2.

Philanthropy can support organizations that provide the technical assistance companies will need to assess and report on financial risks from climate, as well as helping them develop strategies to minimize the potential consequences. We may also have an important role helping to spread the message and make this sort of disclosure more routine.

There is, however, a further step needed to make disclosure effective. The recommendations of the Financial Stability Board urge each business to report its own view of risk and opportunity, in effect, proposing an ad hoc approach. This makes sense give the newness of the effort, but lack of comparability among disclosures severely reduces the value of the information to markets and investors, because there will be no good basis for making valuation and pricing decisions. Yet without a shared methodology for pricing, financial markets can still allocate capital, but cannot do so efficiently, which defeats the whole point of requiring corporate disclosure.

Hence, a further task, in which philanthropy may also have an important role to play, will involve helping financial institutions develop a set of common assumptions and methodologies for valuing climate risk. This means: (1) achieving consensus around a set of scenarios to evaluate risk, for example, a two degree scenario and a scenario in which nations meet their NDCs; (2) developing common assumptions about the likely consequences and implications of the different scenarios; and (3) developing industry-based modeling methodologies to translate these into financial effects that companies can then apply to their particular situation.
All this is well and good, and it will all go far toward maintaining the momentum of recent years toward mitigating climate change. But, still, what are we going to do about the United States? We are, after all, still the world’s largest economy, not to mention its second largest emitter. So even if other countries stay on a low carbon path, we can’t simply write the United States off. Of course, and somewhat sadly, we have been here before (though perhaps not in so extreme and aggressive a manner), and we have some ideas about how to proceed.

To begin, setbacks at the federal level must be expected and will be impossible to avoid. But a lot can be done to prevent the federal government from dismantling gains. New legislation must go through a process that has numerous veto points, even when Republicans control both Houses of Congress. And new regulations cannot be passed or old ones repealed without a reasonable evidentiary basis. Within agencies, but especially through litigation in federal court, we can support grantees and advocacy organizations in mounting an aggressive defense of laws and regulations that address climate change. We may lose the Clean Power Plan (though many states are acting on their own), but we have a strong base in existing statutes and long-standing interpretations around clean air and water, and we believe courts will not allow these to be cast aside in the face of existing practice and strong evidence.

In the meantime, there are good opportunities for progress at the state level, and many states will pursue a positive climate agenda notwithstanding headwinds at the national level. California, the world’s sixth largest economy, remains committed to continuing on its current path and has announced its willingness to work with other states and nations to enlarge its clean energy footprint. Many other states, from New York to Hawaii, have also taken strong action and plan to continue advancing a strong climate agenda. Certainly it would be easier and more efficacious to address clean energy at the national level, but we can get far at the state level.

Lastly, we cannot let up on efforts to reverse the politicization of climate change. Almost all Democrats and a solid majority of Republicans believe that climate change is happening and that it has manmade causes. The problem is that, for Republicans at least, the issue is not a priority. That needs to change. We need to build bipartisan support for addressing climate and accelerating action in the decade ahead. Taken
together, solid defense at the federal level, effective work at the state level, and good strategic communications to build political will can maintain momentum in the U.S. and keep us on track.

One last point. The agenda I’ve sketched out is pretty ambitious. It builds on and adds to work we are already doing. Yet little or none of that work is over or can be abandoned. So while today’s climate funders are investing significant resources in climate mitigation strategies, much higher levels of investment will be needed to pull this off. We need to double or even triple the available resources to succeed. Some of us may need to step up even more. But we also need to find new funders. And we need to begin engaging funders whose focus is on priorities other than climate whose work will be impeded or undone by climate. Funders concerned with public health or with migration or with global development must recognize that climate change threatens everything they care about.

Climate change is, for better or worse, the biggest and most important problem of our time, and as such, it’s a problem we all need to think about.